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seded by a divorce judgment. This interpretation is confirmed
by the third paragraph of R.S. 9:302, under which the award
of a judgment of divorce to a spouse against whom a separation
had been pronounced, because of non-reconciliation of the spouses
during the one year and sixty days or more since the separa-
tion judgment, does not affect the custody rights of the spouse
who obtained the separation judgment.
The termination of the alimony judgment in favor of the
children is even less understandable. It is customary to permit
the spouse seeking the custody of minor children after separa-
tion or divorce to ask for alimony in their behalf, but the claim
of the children, though occasioned by the divorce or separation,
is in no way connected with the separation or divorce proceed-
ings as such. Nothing on alimony for children will be found
in the Civil Code's title on separation and divorce. If children-
are entitled to alimony as of and after a judgment of separation
or divorce, it is simply because they are children and in need. 81
If the spouse obtaining custody and tutorship of a minor asks
for alimony for its support, it is really in the capacity of tutor
or tutrix of the child. If it is customary to deal with this matter
in the same suit as that for divorce or separation, and even to
make the award to the wife in her own name rather than to her
as tutrix, it is nevertheless true that it cannot be identified with
the subject matter of the divorce or separation suit or be con-




The Commission Council of the City of New Orleans author-
ized the Commissioner of Public Buildings and Parks to sell land
comprised within "Commerce Place" but the highest bidder re-
fused to complete the transaction on the ground that the city
could not transfer a merchantable title. The trial judge recog-
nized the city's ownership and right of alienation for private use,
31. Id. arts. 227, 229.
32. Id. arts. 350, 229.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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but the Supreme Court reversed.' Several opinions were ren-
dered on original hearing and rehearing. The net result is that
the property was deemed a "public square" the ownership of
which had vested in the city by dedication in 1836. In the classi-
fication of things under Civil Code Articles 449, 453, and 454,
"public things" are those which are not susceptible of private
ownership, and a public square is one of the specific illustrations
cited. Of course, the Civil Code is a statute and special deviation
may be made by subsequent legislation.
The city asserted certain provisions of its charter as imply-
ing this authority but the court properly held that such authority
would have to be express, which was not the case. On rehear-
ing, it was conceded that the 1948 amendment of the charter did
have such authorization but that the necessary procedure had not
been followed to show written approval by 70% of the property
owners within a radius of 300 feet. The dissents differed from
the majority on the interpretation of the city charter as embody-
ing legislative authorization to change the classification of public
things and alienate them for private use, and on the classifica-
tion of the property as a public square. However, it would ap-
pear to be the sounder policy to protect as far as possible the
insusceptibility to private ownership, and to insist upon specific
compliance with express legislative authorization to change the
classification of "public things."
OWNERSHIP
According to the principle of "accession," the landowner ac-
quires the ownership of what is produced by the land.2 An ex-
ception exists in favor of the bona fide possessor so that when
he is evicted by the real owner and has to return the property
he may keep the fruits as his own.8 The person whose possession
was not in good faith must restore all the fruits that were pro-
duced during his occupancy, and this is generally understood to
include the rental value of the property itself.4 In Juneau V.
Laborde,5 where the evicted party was a co-owner whose posses-
sion of the whole property was not in good faith, a distinction
1. City of New Orleans v. Louisiana Society of Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals, 229 La. 246, 85 So.2d 503 (1956).
2. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 498-501 (1870).
3. LA. CiviL CODE arts. 502-503 (1870).
4. Succession of Hawthorne, 158 La. 637, 104 So. 481 (1925).
5. 228 La. 410, 82 So.2d 693 (1955).
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was drawn between the objective fruits and the rental value of
the personal use of the property. 6 The plaintiffs, who were found
to be the real owners of almost a one-half interest in the prop-
erty, had recovered their just proportion of the rents and reve-
nues which had accrued during the defendant's occupancy, but
for defendant's personal use of the land the court denied recov-
ery of rental value duly calculated at a certain monthly rate.
The court pointed out that the right of co-owners to posses-
sion of the property is equal and coextensive7 (until partition)
so that neither becomes indebted to the other for his personal oc-
cupancy, use and enjoyment. It was therefore proper to refuse
recovery on the basis that in the case of co-owners this element
of restitution is distinguished from rents and revenues derived
either from lease or exploitation.
SERVITUDES
In English Realty Co. v. Meyer a number of factual and legal
issues became interwoven in an unusual pattern. Plaintiff had
owned a large tract of land, and after selling most of this land
it sued one of its vendees for a right of passage under Civil Code
Article 699 because it had no access to a public road. The trial
judge granted a servitude but the Supreme Court reversed.
Article 699 contemplates "the owner whose estate is enclosed,
and who has no way to a public road, a railroad, a tramroad or
a watercourse." This was written a long time ago, and transpor-
tation conditions have changed sufficiently to warrant a real-
istic and reasonable interpretation of the Code article. In pass-
ing, the court mentioned that the contiguity of plaintiff's prop-
erty to a railroad might not preclude his estate from being "en-
closed," and under present conditions this point might well be
made stronger. Today, even a property with access to a water-
course could well be considered as "enclosed" with need for
access to a public road.
In the present case, the plaintiff's property was also contig-
uous to a public road but was cut off from access to it. For part
of this frontage, an overpass and embankment made access im-
possible; and for the remainder of the frontage, the City of
6. See prior decisions between same parties in Juneau v. Laborde, 219 La.
921, 54 So.2d 325 (1951) ; and 224 La. 672, 70 So.2d 451 (1954).
7. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 494 (1870).
8. 228 La. 423, 82 So.2d 698 (1955).
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Shreveport had duly prohibited access because this would consti-
tute a serious traffic hazard. The facts that the plaintiff had
acquired the original large tract subsequent to the construction
of the overpass and embankment, and that it had plenty of access
to available public roads before selling most of the property was
apparently and understandably an important element in the de-
cision of the case.
However, two points should be noted. First, the court held
that a proprietor adjoining a public road does not have an en-
closed estate within the purview of Article 699 because neither
the state nor its political subdivisions has the right to deny him
access to the adjoining public way, and, even if the denial is
justified, this does not suffice to burden another person's adja-
cent property with a servitude of passage. These statements
contain some measure of contradiction, but might be reconciled
on the basis of the court's suggestion that the proprietor has re-
course against the public authority for damages or compensation
on account of such denial of access to an adjoining public road.
Secondly, the changes in modern transportation and the new
developments of highway and city traffic problems warrant a
re-examination of the limited scope of the rule in Article 699.
LEVEES
Since the earliest history of Louisiana, there has been a servi-
tude for levee purposes on riparian properties bordering navi-
gable rivers and streams.9 With the necessity of treating levees
as part of a larger flood control program, their construction
could no longer be located exclusively at the edge of the water °
and even when placed at a considerable distance inland this is
considered as being within the operation of the levee servitude.
However, nowhere is there mention of property bordering on
"lakes." In the case of Delaune v. Board of Commissioners for
the Pontchartrain Levee District" a levee had been constructed
along the shore of the lake and the landowner sued to recover for
the land thus appropriated. The trial court dismissed the suit on
an exception of no cause of action by reason of the legal servi-
9. LA. CrvI. CODE art. 665 (1870) ; Dickson v. Board of Commissioners, 210
La. 121, 26 So.2d 474 (1946) ; Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452, 16 S.Ct.
345, 40 L.Ed. 490 (1896).
10. Of. LA. CrvIL CODE art. 457 (1870). See Wolfe v. Hurley, 46 F.2d 515
(W.D. La. 1930), affd 283 U.S. 801 (1930); Board of Commissioners of Tensas
Basin Levee Dist. v. Franklin, 219 La. 859, 54 So.2d 125 (1951).
11. 230 La. 117, 87 So.2d 749 (1956).
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tude of Article 665; the Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
Property on Lake Pontchartrain is not a priori subject to a pub-
lic servitude for levees under Article 665. At the same time, it
does not follow that it may not be subject to this servitude. How-
ever, the burden of proof is on the levee board to show that the
property "is within range of the reasonable necessities of the




Succession of Ryan' is concerned with the question of revoca-
tion of a principal will by a later one valid in form but allegedly
containing a prohibited substitution and hence invalid in sub-
stance. The matter was argued on an exception of no right of
action brought by a niece of the testatrix claiming only as a
legatee under the prior will. Thus, the question of whether or
not the language of the second will should be interpreted as a
substitution was not passed upon. On rehearing the court held
that the first will was tacitly revoked by the second which was
valid in form and indicated a change of intention by the testa-
trix whether the bequest showing this change could be executed
or not.
This distinction between invalidity of form and substance
adds further complexity to the question of revocation of wills, an
already most disturbing subject. The historical and legislative
intent approach was taken in arriving at the conclusion. Article
1519 of the Revised Civil Code of 1870 states that "those [condi-
tions] which are contrary to the laws . . . are reputed not writ-
ten." If the bequest in the later will was a prohibited substitu-
tion (which was not passed upon) and thus "not written," the
later will might have been said to be bare of substance and thus
not to have exhibited a change of intention by the testatrix. The
author of the opinion on first hearing, wherein this distinction
between form and substance was not found, dissented on the re-
hearing.
12. 87 So.2d at 754.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 228 La. 447, 82 So.2d 759 (1955).
